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Abstract
The economic decision to cease working is traditionally based on standard
life-cycle models, where individuals trade-off between market work versus
home production or leisure. In this paper, we study such transitions out of
work for 26 EU countries over the period 2004-2011 in order to investigate
the determinants of retirement: income and health, in particular. Control-
ling for these factors, we do not find any significant differences in the retire-
ment pattern between the average euro area and EU non-euro area countries.
Moreover, we find that shifts into retirement have increased during the onset
of the 2008-09 economic and financial crisis. Income, together with flexible
working arrangements, as well as private pension plans, are found to be im-
portant as regards early retirement decisions, compared to retiring on (or
beyond) the legal retirement age. Concerning health measures, we show that
institutional factors (such as, state / health benefits, minimum retirement
age) could not be sufficient alone if individuals withdraw earlier from the la-
bor market due to a weakening of their health. Especially, these latter results
can be of importance for structural and macroeconomic policy, for instance,
in increasing the employment of both people and hours worked against the
background of population aging.
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1. Introduction
Population ageing is expected to result in a slowdown of labour force
growth and, later, into its contraction and change in composition, as pro-
jected by the “2012 Ageing Report” by the European Commission (2011).
While it is accepted that the demographic shift will add to pressure on the
sustainability of public finances in many European countries, the implica-
tions for the long-term growth of the labour force are still open issues. If, on
the one hand, labour demand is expected to be lower, owing to the shrinkage
of the working age population, on the other hand, participation rates for cer-
tain age cohorts could increase as well given that working lives will be longer,
foreseeing pension reforms. Both aspects prompt several policy questions on
labour market developments; such as how to promote longer working lives or
how to improve choices for those workers forced to continue to work late in
their lives.
Policy makers have been promoting the expansion of working lives finding
measures to postpone the labour market activity.1 Therefore, understanding
in greater details the motivations for retirement is key as it could assist the
formulation of policies encouraging the return of retirees to employment or
decreasing the incentives of withdrawing earlier from the labour market.
In standard life-cycle models, workers are often assumed to dace the choice
of leaving the labour market based on their own preferences (Fengler, 1975;
Hayward, Grady and McLaughlin, 1988) and/or based on the trade-off be-
tween market work versus home production or leisure (for an overview see
Duggan, 1984; Bazzoli 1985; Blndal and Scarpetta 1999; Duval 2003; Gruber
and Wise 2002; Meghir and Whitehouse 1997). This latter specification has
been particularly supported in modern micro-founded models (e.g., of the
New Keynesian type) for macroeconomic analysis. In practice, however, dif-
ferent constraints can influence the labour force participation decisions of the
elderly. Financial considerations are often found to be one of the most im-
portant determinants of (early) retirement (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg,
2004; Montalto, 2011). Moreover, personal health or the need to provide
1Certainly, reflecting retirement patterns, the decision to enter retirement will no longer
be a discrete choice: with some workers remaining fully in employment and/or others
reducing the number of hours worked as they age (see also Hurd, 1993).
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care to a household member can equally be an important reason to retire,
especially before the legal retirement age (see inter alia, Bound, 1991; Bound
et al. 1999; Jones et al., 2008; 2010; Deschryvere, 2005; Disney et al., 2006).
In this paper we employ a wide set of socio-economic and environmental
variables to study exits into retirement in the EU, mainly based on the de-
terminants above. Based on longitudinal data from the Eurostat Survey on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) – covering the period 2004-2011 –
we analyse the probability of retiring at a given age, given that the person
has not retired yet (see also Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Hagan, Jones and
Rice, 2009; Jones, Rice and Roberts, 2010).
The contribution of this paper can be gauged under two perspectives.
First, we provide results for a large set of 26 EU countries, by providing a
systematic, conditional approach on income and health variables to estimate
labour market work-to-(early) retirement transitions. Secondly, we exploit
cross country differences, in quantifying the size and the speed with which
employment-to-retirement changes took place.
Since it would be natural to hypothesize upfront that retirement dynam-
ics changes over time – especially after 2008-09, reflecting the extent to which
the global economic and financial crisis hit in most countries – and across euro
area versus EU non-euro area countries – reflecting region-specific dynamics
and institutional set ups – we pay particular attention to those dynamics.
Nonetheless, the results in this paper do not support any significant differ-
ences in the employment-to-retirement patterns between the average euro
area and EU non-euro area countries. However, shifts into retirement seem
to have increased during the onset of the crisis, particularly when controlling
for income.
The main results also suggest that income variables, such as benefits (typ-
ically temporary in nature, e.g., sickness benefits), as well as the availability
of private pension plans, are found to be important as regards early retire-
ment decisions, compared to retiring beyond the legal retirement age. In the
same vein, flexible working arrangements are found to be important in or-
der to keep people at work beyond the legal retirement age, thus suggesting
that making use of partial working schemes could modify retirement patterns
towards postponing the labour market withdrawal.
In line with the literature, our findings also point to the fact that health
is an important determinant of retirement in the EU, as healthier people
are found to continue to work and retire later (see inter alia, Bound, 1991;
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Jones et al., 2008; 2010; Deschryvere, 2005; Disney et al., 2006).2 Moreover,
individuals with partners in bad health are generally associated with a lower
likelihood to retire compared to individuals with partners in better health
status (see also Wu, 2003).
All in all, we conclude that institutional factors (such as, state / health
benefits, minimum retirement age) could not be sufficient alone if individuals
withdraw earlier from the labour market due to a weakening of their health.
Particularly, for early retirees, policies aimed at improving the health of
the workforce and at keeping people who experience health problems active
may be crucial. Particularly, these latter results may have implications for
the effectiveness of active labour market policies, by getting retired people
back into work or helping the prolongation of long term employment spells.
Moreover, the findings are of importance for structural and macroeconomic
policy, for example, in increasing the employment of both people and hours
worked against the background of population ageing.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
theory behind the life-cycle model. Section 3 summarizes the EU-SILC data
utilized. Section 4 and 5 present the econometric approach and the main
results, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2. The economic decision to retire
The economic decision by which a person ends the labor market partic-
ipation fits well into standard life-cycle models in a neoclassical sense (see
Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004).
In a standard fashion, let us consider a person employed in year τ (i.e.
equal to his / her age) and let us suppose that that person is willing to
retire on a given future date Ts > τ . In a classic model of labor supply,
the evolution of the representative worker’s wealth, starting from date τ , can
be described as a dynamic decision. Here, it is normally assumed that the
individual has a given endowment and we denote rt as the real interest rate
between periods t − 1 and t. In each period, the available time (i.e. be it
a day, a month, or a year) is normalized to unity to simplify the notation.
Henceforth, the hours worked during time t are given by (1− Lt).
Defining At as the consumer’s wealth (total disposable income, including
assets) and Bt as the non-wage income for a given initial value of accumulated
2For a survey of the literature see Deschrivere (2005).
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income, A0, allows us to describe the evolution of wealth of the consumer as:
At = (1 + rt)At−1 +Bt + wt(1− Lt)− Ct
where At − (1 + rt)At−1 is the evolution of the consumer’s wealth, Bt and
wt(1− Lt) are non-wage and wage income, respectively, and Ct is consump-
tion. To simplify the problem, in these models it is normal to assume that
the agent does not work after date Ts, thus the economic decision to retire
becomes a discrete one. Hence, for t > Ts, leisure time will be Lt = 1.3
Following a standard approach (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004), we de-
note Bt(Ts) as the income expected in period t > Ts, composed of pension
payments over the period t and other sources of income. Equally, Bt(t) will
designate the non-wage income of the consumer while he / she is not working
and denote Cet and Crt, respectively, as the consumption of physical good
during employment (e) and retirement (r).
For a given retirement age, Ts, the representative agent will solve the










subject to the constraints:
At =
{
(1 + rt)At−1 +Bt(0) + wt(1− Lt)− Cet if τ < t < Ts − 1
(1 + rt)At−1 +Bt(Ts)− Crt if Ts 6 t 6 T
As we will show in the next section, in continuous time, Ts can be seen
through the lenses of an event study.
2.1. Intrafamilial decisions
With respect to the problem set out above, the family, and the partner
in particular, has considerable influence on the decision to retire. In the
empirical approach that follows, we take into account the influence of the
family structure. This is particularly relevant, as it give us ground for a
framework going behind the individual decision to retire.
In order to extend the basic life-cycle model, we follow Cahuc and Zyl-
berberg (2004) and consider a family composed of two individuals. Hence,
3Certainly, the process to retire can be gradual with people moving to part-time working
schemes before retiring completely.
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we assume that the preferences of family are represented by the following
utility function:
U(Ce1t, Cr1t, Ce2t, Cr2t, L1t, L2t)
where Cei and Cri represent the consumption during employment (e) and re-
tirement (r) of physical goods and Li (with i = 1, 2) denotes the leisure of in-
dividual i. This formalization, generally known as the ”collective approach”,
assumes that decision making is something individuals do within the family
(see also Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Hurd, 1990; Michaud, 2003).
As we shall discuss in our data section, this framework is particularly
useful given the construction of our dataset.
A suitable model to model all intra-family decisions is the collective model
presented by Chiappori (1988, 1992). In particular, the latter (Chiappori,
1992, proposition 1 ) shows that the efficient solution of the individual prefer-
ences of the people composing the household is also the solution to individual
optimization problem in which each person would be endowed with a specific
non-wage income, which will depend on the overall household disposable in-
come / wealth (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004).
More precisely, by simply using Chappori’s (1992) intuition above, the prob-
lem of agent 1 – or the agent taking the decision to retire, specifically – would
take the form:
MaxCe1t,Cr1t,L1t,Ts,tU(Ce1t, Cr1t, L1t)
subject to the constraints:
Φt =
{
(1 + rt)At−1 +B1t(0) + w1t(1− L1t)− Ce1t if τ < t < Ts − 1
(1 + rt)At−1 +B1t(Ts)− Cr1t if Ts 6 t 6 T
where Φt = Φ(At, wit, Bit) would have the typical interpretation of Chiap-
pori’s (1992) ”sharing rule”, depending, as before, on the household’s wealth
At, plus the parameters wi (for τ < t < Ts − 1) and Bi (for t 6 T ) for i=2.
In this way, w2 and B2 will be exogenous to consumer’s 1 decision. Hence,
one can write down the welfare optimization problem of consumer 1 in the
standard way (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). By designating the value
of the welfare of consumer 1 at the optimum of the problem as Vτ (Ts) and
denoting the legal age of retirement Tm, as the institutional age after which
it will not be possible to work any more, agent 1 (aged τ) will choose the
date Ts on which he / she will end his or her work pattern by solving the
following problem:
MaxsVτ (Ts) subject to Tm > Ts > τ
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This simple model does not consider explicitly the possibility of working
beyond the legal retirement age (i.e. Tm 6 Ts). However, this is a strong
theoretical assumption, which we will not enforce when estimating our econo-
metric model.
The problem above has a difficult solution and it is normally solved nu-
merically (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). In order to simplify the expla-
nation, in the next sections we will rest on this baseline problem, trying to
empirically measure what, beyond the personal characteristics, may affect
the decision to retire. For this purpose, we will show that a hazard duration
model can be quite helpful.
3. Data
In this paper we use the Eurostat Survey on Income and Living Con-
ditions (EU-SILC) to model a simple model of retirement. The EU-SILC
consists of a database available in yearly frequencies, broadly based on a ro-
tating panel of longitudinal data for 4 sub-samples. The EU-SILC provides
the longest time series of comparable and consistently defined individual level
data for income and living conditions available for the EU, and our sample
consists of 26 countries covering the period 2004-2011. The sample excludes
Germany owing to data unavailability.4 Compared to other surveys, the EU-
SILC provides not only details on each individual’s personal characteristics
(i.e. gender, age, marital status, education, family composition, etc.), but
also information on the level of (household) income prior to retiring and mea-
sures of the individual’s wealth status, including wage and non-wage income
(benefits, cash transfers), interest, dividends, profit from capital investment,
hence being particularly suited to test a simple model of retirement as de-
tailed in Section 2. This represents an advantage compared to other datasets,
given that income composition, and wealth at large, is indeed an important
determinants of retirement decisions (see for instance, Hanoch and Honig,
1983; Mitchel and Fields, 1984; Dugan, 1984; Ruhm, 1990).5
Consistent with life-cycle theory, an individual’s decision to retire, or the
4Germany is covered by EU-SILC but their longitudinal microdata are not disseminated
according to the EC Regulation no. 223/2009.
5Yet, although there exists an observed retirement framework based around state pen-
sion eligibility in each country (see OECD, 2011), people make transitions into and out of
work until advanced ages, making observed employment histories rather complex.
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employment-to-retirement transition, is the event of interest in our study.
From the EU-SILC, we construct transitions from employment to retirement,
or the probability of remaining in employment, based on each respondent’s
current and past activity status.
Moving from employment to retirement, or retiring in the next period, is
typically referred to as a ’failure’ event which can occur at any point in time
after an ’onset of risk’ period is defined. Here, the ‘onset of risk’ period is
defined as each individual’s first entry into the labour market.
To analyze employment-to-retirement transitions, we employ a hazard
based duration model (see, Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Hagan, Jones and
Rice, 2009; Jones, Rice and Roberts, 2010). This allows modeling the length
of time spent at work before moving into retirement. The dependent variable
is thus the amount of time that an individual spends in employment before
entering retirement (i.e. employment duration) in a discrete fashion.6
One statistical motivation for employing a duration analysis framework
includes first of all the possibility of bringing to the data standard economic
approaches, such as standard life-cycle models, where the decision to retire
is indeed modeled discretely, and it is assumed to be influenced by a whole
range of (wage and non-wage) income components, both individually and at
the household level.
In addition, duration analysis is particularly useful given the presence of
censored and left-truncated data in our dataset. In practice, not all obser-
vations’ full history is observed until the ‘failure’ event (i.e. the decision to
retire). This naturally classifies the EU-SILC data as right-censored. In-
stead, the left truncation problem refers to the fact that individuals become
at risk or even fail before we can enroll them in the study (see Figure 1).
Left truncation is a natural feature of our data and involves the impossi-
bility of tracking individuals over the whole working life. Taking into account
this particular data structure, an individual’s full employment history is in-
ferred based on retrospective information about the age at which he / she
first started working and the years spent on paid work. This formalisation
does not clearly take into account the possibility of multiple ‘failure’ events
within the same employment history, but rather assumes that each indi-
vidual’s working history is continuous until retirement, consistent with the
discussion in Section 2.
6In Appendix A we detail the variables used in the estimation.
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Figure 1: Examples of left truncation in the EU-SILC data
In the same vein, individuals can enter the observation period / being
enrolled in the study upon having retired already. Here, an important dif-
ference of our study, compared to standard duration analyses, is that the
failure event does not represent a rationale for an individual to drop out of
sample (e.g., as death). Whenever enrollment occurs, conditional on a previ-
ous retirement event (see Figure 1(b)), there may exist a positive difference
between employment duration and the year of enrollment in the study, rep-
resenting a gap of information about each individual’s activity between the
period he / she ceased to work and the period he / she became under obser-
vation. Only those with a gap < |G|, where G is arbitrarily chosen, as well
as those reporting to have most recently changed their activity status ‘from
employment to retirement’ are considered in this analysis. The gap variable
is however not restricted to be exactly zero, i.e. G = 3, allowing for report-
ing errors in (i) age, (ii) age of the first job and (iii) the number of years
spent on paid work. Importantly, this is not found to significantly affect our
results, as the inclusion of a whole set of covariates in the regressions will
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anyway require censoring on many of these individuals with 0 < gap < |G|.7
As individuals’ working histories are inferred based on retrospective ques-
tions, only the last spell is considered, for individuals employed at all times.
Conversely, only the spell of retirement is considered for individuals retired
in the sample. This allows data tractability in such a duration analysis
framework.
The dataset employed consists of more than 209.000 individuals. Out
of this number, 6512 individuals, that is just over 3% of the sample, are
observed retiring. As Table 1 suggests, the majority of these retirees ceased
working at the age of 55 or later. Women represent nearly 38% of the sample.
Table 1: Retirees by age group and gender
Percent of all obser-
vations
Age Groups Males Females Total
Age 0 to 24 0.1 0.1 0.1
Age 25 to 29 0.2 0.1 0.2
Age 30 to 34 0.2 0.2 0.2
Age 35 to 39 0.4 0.4 0.4
Age 40 to 44 1.4 0.8 1.2
Age 45 to 49 2.6 2.0 2.4
Age 50 to 54 5.2 5.1 5.2
Age 55 to 59 24.8 41 31
Age 60 to 65 47.5 37.3 43.6
Age > 66 17.5 12.9 15.8
Total obs. 4,044 2,468 6,512
Gender representation is reversed for ages between 55 and 59, where
women represent the majority of the sample considered. In general, female
7The analysis in the empirical section requires individuals to be observed at least for
two consecutive periods (t-1 and t). For instance, an individual retired at time t, should
provide information on his previous (t-1) employment status (be it part time or full time
employment) or the occupation sector in which he / she most recently worked prior to
retiring. Thus, when individuals are enrolled upon having retired, information on previous
employment status is clearly missing, making those individuals not eligible for the empirical
analysis in Section 4.
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workers retire earlier than males. Nearly 50% of female workers enter into
retirement before the age of 60, compared to about 35% of the male workers.
In our sample, the age of retirement spans from a minimum of 20 years
to a maximum of 80 years, with the average occurring at the age of 60.4 and
the median at 60. Thus, the distribution of retirees is clearly skewed towards
older people (see Table 2).




10% 55 21 Obs 6512
25% 57 22 Sum of Wgt. 6512
50% 60 Mean 60.443
Largest Std. Dev. 6.442
75% 64 80
90% 67 80 Variance 41.494
95% 71 80 Skewness -0.656
99% 78 80 Kurtosis 7.322
4. Empirical methodology
Consistent with the discussion in the previous sections, the main advan-
tage of using duration analysis in this framework is that it allows modeling
the length of time spent in a given state (i.e. employment) before moving into
another state (i.e. retirement). Relative to other approaches such as those
that focus on the unconditional probability of an event taking place (e.g. a
probit or logit models), our focus here is on the conditional probability, or,
the probability that the spell of one particular status (e.g., employment) will
end in the next short interval of time, given that it has lasted until recently.
As the analysis is concerned with the timing of the observed change from
employment to retirement (or ‘failure’ event), it makes sense to conceptualize
the length of each individual j ’s employment spell as a random variable, Tsj.
8
8See Box-Steffensmeier and Sokhey (2010) and Jenkins (2008) for a methodological
11
As in Section 2, we denote Ts as the actual retirement age, which is, in our
framework, equal to the duration of the individual’s employment spell.
Assuming Tsj has a continuous probability distribution f(t), where t is a
realization of Tsj, the cumulative distribution function of Ts will be given by:




This says that the survival function for the j -th individual, or the probability
that his / her employment spell Ts is of length at least equal to t, is:




Conversely, the hazard rate (or instantaneous failure rate) for individual j at
time t, is defined instead as the marginal probability of immediate retirement,
conditional on not having retired before time t :







The class of models above can be distinguished between non-parametric,
semi-parametric and full parametric models on the basis of whether they
predict the probability distribution of a certain event by means of a set of
additional covariates. While parametric models are widely used across nu-
merous fields of economics, the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972;
1975) has proven particularly flexible. Compared to fully parametric ap-
proaches, a key benefit of this approach is that it allows ’avoid[ing] having
to make assumptions about the nature of the duration times in the first
place’ (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). In other words, the Cox model
makes no assumption about the shape of the hazard function or about how
covariates may affect this shape.9 Thus, the Cox semi-parametric approach
is regarded as a benchmark in this paper, whereas non-parametric (Section
5.1) and fully parametric approaches are employed for preliminary investi-
gation of the data and robustness checks, respectively. In particular, a fully
overview.
9For further references see Cleves et al. (2010).
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parametric regression corroborates our findings. The results of the latter are
delegated to the Appendix C for sake of brevity.10
In the Cox model, the hazard for the j -th individual in the data is assumed
to be:
h (t|xj) = h0 (t) exp (β′xj) (3)
where β′ is the vector of regression coefficients; x a vector of covariates
which influence the hazard rate; and h0(t) is the baseline hazard function.
11
By default, the model assumes a baseline hazard that is common to all the
individuals in the study population. In this way, covariates act multiplica-
tively on the baseline hazard, adding additional risks on an individual basis,
as determined by the individuals’ prognostic information. This gives the
model a simple and easily understood interpretation. The main idea behind
it is the separation of the time effect in the baseline hazard function, on one
side, and the effect of the covariates in an exponential term, on the other. In
essence this assumption says that the hazard of failure at time t is related
to individuals or groups of individuals by a proportionality constant which
does not depend on t.
4.1. Frailty models
When observations are conditionally different in terms of their hazards
due to unobserved heterogeneity, standard models, as the one just described,
may lead to spurious duration dependence.12 Hence, fitting a normal dura-
tion model, for instance equation (3) would simply not recognize that some
observations are more ’frail’ (or, failure prone) than others.
A first possible solution would be to include fixed effects. However, it
has been shown that fixed effects are not a viable alternative in this context,
as there is an incidental parameter problem that leads to inconsistent and
10Fully parametric models will be efficient only as long as the distributional assumptions
are appropriately chosen in the class of parametric lifetime distributions (e.g., exponential,
weibull, gompertz, log-normal, log-logistic or gamma). Clearly, if the hazard function
shape is incorrectly specified, parameters can be seriously biased.
11In particular, when inference is dependent on the form of exp(β′x) but still indepen-
dent of h0(t), one speaks of a semi-parametric model (see Cox; 1972, 1975).
12The notion of unobserved heterogeneity amounts here to observations being condition-
ally different in terms of their hazards in ways that are unaccounted for in the systematic
part of the model.
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deflated standard errors (see Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001; Zorn, 2000).
An alternative method is to use random effects or ‘frailty’ models instead.
The basic idea behind frailty models is to introduce an additional random
parameter into the hazard rate accounting exactly for unobserved hetero-
geneity. This also allows us to cope with the idea that the decision to retire
happens in an environment the characteristics of which are richer than the
ones we can possibly observe (Section 2). Frailties may be individual-specific
or group-specific. Models constructed in terms of group-level frailties are
typically referred to as ‘shared’ frailty models because observations within a
sub-group are assumed to share unmeasured risk factors prompting them to
fail earlier.
Lancaster (1979) proposed a parametric mixed proportional hazard model,
accounting for unobserved ‘frailties’, which is a generalization of Cox’s (1972)
approach. This specifies the hazard rate for the j -th individual as (see also
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Zorn, 2000):13
h (t|xj) = h0 (t) exp (β′xj) exp (vj) (4)
where vj describes the individual- or group-specific unobserved hetero-
geneity. For identification purposes, the mean of v is typically normalized
to unity and its variance is assumed to equal to an unobserved parameter θ,
which is to be estimated.14 Compared to the standard Cox (1972) regression
approach, integrating v out leaves with the only problem of estimating the








13In essence the concept goes back to the work of Greenwood and Yule (1920) on accident
proneness. The term frailty itself was introduced by Vaupel et al. (1979) in univariate
survival models.
14As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) note, we always make assumptions about
whether we use frailty models or not. When we do not take account of frailty, we are
essentially assuming that v=1 with probability 1.
15To derive the expected value of the survivor function, a probability distribution for
v needs to be specified. Albeit the gamma is the most common in the literature, any
continuous distribution with positive support, a unit mean, and a finite variance θ –
inverse Gaussian, log-normal etc. would be appropriate. Essentially, as long as we assume





In order to summarize the data and visualize the shape of employment
duration for the sample or for separate consumers’ groups, we first intro-
duce non-parametric estimation of the survivor and hazard functions relying
on product-limit estimators.16 Table 3 reports the survivor and cumulative
hazard function for employment duration. The survivor function shows the
proportion of people who remain in employment (i.e. do not ‘fail’ by en-
tering retirement) as time proceeds, while the cumulative hazard shows the
expected number of ’failures’ at each observed time. On average, after 40
years of work, the survivor function starts decaying very rapidly, with the
proportion of people still employed decreasing over time. This is in line
with the idea that the definable pensionable age requires around 40 years of
contribution, consistent with the evidence in OECD (2011) and European
Commission (2011). Still, different conditions may apply depending on the
number of years of contributions achieved at a certain date or the age of first
entry into the pension system.
As shown in Table 3, after 44 years of work the probability of remaining
in employment is around 0.63, indicating that roughly 37% of the sampled
individuals where retired. Furthermore, the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard
suggests that the hazard of exiting into retirement increases monotonically.17
Survivor functions from employment to retirement across different categories,
as well as by country, are plotted in Figure A1 and A2 in Appendix B.
5.2. Semi-parametric analysis
In this section, estimates of the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard
models are presented. As discussed in Section 4, a parametric analysis offers
an advantage over the non-parametric methods, as it allows predicting the
16We use the Kaplan-Meier (1985) and the estimators dating back to Nelson (1972) and
Aalen (1978) (referred to as Nelson-Aalen estimator) for the estimation of the survivor
and cumulative hazard function respectively. For further details see also Kiefer (1988).
17It is worth noting that for the survivor function and the cumulative hazard function,
both the Kaplan-Meyer and the Nelson-Aalen estimators are consistent estimates of each
function respectively, and their statistics are asymptotically equivalent (see Klein and
Moeschberger, 2003).
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probability distribution of retirement by means of a set of additional covari-
ates. In what follows the joint effect of various individual and labor market
characteristics affecting the probability of exiting into retirement is analyzed.
In Table 4, the estimated results from the Cox’s proportional hazard
model are reported.18 The reported coefficients are hazard ratios.19 As ex-
plained in Section 4, a ’shared’ frailty model is employed where the sub-
groups are selected according to the number of countries in our sample (i.e.
26). Thus, the model assumes that observations share group-specific, unmea-
sured, risk factors that prompt exits into retirement. As the frailty terms
explicitly account for the extra variance associated with such risk factors, we
can evaluate the hypothesis that θ = 0 to determine whether the choice of
treating unobserved heterogeneity in the model is motivated. Supporting our
concerns, the nested model under θ = 0 is always preferred to the reference
non-frailty model according to the relevant LR test at the bottom of Table 4.
Based on our discussion in Section 2, our income variable is indeed a pooled
one and it is composed of wage and non-wage income (including public /
private pension plans, age and state benefits) as well interest, dividends and
profit from capital investment (see Appendix A for definitions).
Focusing on the regression results, the estimated hazard ratios indicate
that there is no significant difference in the patterns of retirement between
residents in the euro area (EA) and EU non-euro area countries. Moreover,
the results suggest that the onset of the global financial crisis and following
years significantly increased flows into retirement. However, it is only when
controlling for household disposable income and personal benefits that we
achieve this result. When omitting the income variables from the regression,
the result rather suggest that the hazard to retire decreased after 2009. The
importance of the income variables for the result of the 2009 crisis on the
hazard to retire may stem from the fact that wealth for people eligible to
retirement generally became at risk after 2009, with income to cover basic
expenses in retirement running short because of the financial crisis.20
18A sensitivity analysis is performed in Appendix C showing that the results from the
Cox proportion model are robust also when using full parametric models.
19A coefficient of, e.g., 0.5 for a dummy variable is interpreted as lowering the exit rate
from employment to retirement by a half. For a continuous variable, a coefficient of 0.5
implies that a one unit change in the variable is associated with a hazard rate of 1/2 as
large and an n unit change in the variable is associated with a hazard rate (1/2)n as large.
20In the present context it is, however, difficult to distinguish labor market quits from
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From Table 4 we also find that setting a minimum retirement age reduces
the hazard to retire. This can be interpreted in the light of providing workers
with a yardstick or a minimum number of years with payment to social
security before they become eligible to retire.
Beyond more institutional factors, the participation of elderly workers is
also affected by a wide set of socio-economic and environmental variables
such as gender (female) and occupation groups (occ. group). While we find
increased movements toward retirement among female workers, we do not
find any statistical difference as to whether a person is married or not.
Besides, the personal characteristics typically associated with higher ed-
ucation (skilled) are not found to generally lead workers to work longer than
their less-educated counterparts. This is somewhat consistent with the find-
ings in Autor and Dorn (2009) reporting an inverted U-shape relationship
between skills and changes in the mean age, suggesting that occupations in
the bottom and top deciles of the skill distribution tend to work on average
less than people with middle-skill jobs.
Working (or having worked) part-time plays a very important role in
reducing the hazard to retire. This is in line with the empirical evidence (see,
inter alia, Machado and Portela, 2012) that retirement is no longer likely to
be a discrete choice: with some workers exiting from full-time employment
and making use of flexible working schemes before withdrawing completely
from the labor market.
Furthermore, some occupation groups are found to have important ex-
planatory power. Compared to the category of professionals, technicians
and associate professionals (occ. group =1 ), those belonging to the cate-
gory including service, skilled agricultural and fishery workers (occ. group
=2 ), and those with elementary occupations (occ. group =5 ), show a sig-
nificantly lower probability to retire. Albeit with such sectoral categories
it is not possible to distinguish between private or public sector employees
(see Appendix A), these results probably reconcile with the idea that formal
workers are expected to retire earlier than casual workers and self-employed,
typically belonging to some of the categories listed above (i.e., elementary
occupations, agriculture and fishing).
Looking at the income variables, household disposable income ultimately
does not exert an influence on standard retirement decisions in our sam-
lay-offs.
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ple. Nevertheless, the marginal effect or the interaction between working
part-time and disposable income (part-time x disp. income) is significant
in reducing employment duration. This result suggests that there exist a
marginal effect of income when employment is not full-time, or, the marginal
exposure to the current (or past) level of income is higher when not working
full-time (see also Blake, 2007; Montalto, 2001).
In addition, the availability of private pension plans (private pension),
does play a significant effect, with the coefficient’s magnitude making 16%
more likely the decision to retire.
Along the same lines, other sources of income supports are very likely
to influence the labor supply of the aged as well; in line with the evidence
that unemployment schemes or temporary benefits, at large, may induce
older workers to seek part-time jobs or to withdraw earlier from the labor
market.21 These overall results support the idea that workers generally tend
to react to financial incentives that accompany early retirements (Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2004).
The variation in age of eligibility for social security benefits (old age,
disability and / or sickness benefits) can particularly affect the sustainabil-
ity of the retirement status. It should be borne in mind that the effect
of pension schemes and benefits are not exogenous to income, as pension
scheme produce inter-temporal substitution effects (i.e. with a postponement
of the retirement age today in favour of an expected higher pension return
tomorrow). In this setting, receiving positive old age benefits or unemploy-
ment benefits significantly increases retirement decisions, in line with the
idea that social insurance schemes such as disability benefits significantly in-
crease flows out of employment (for an overall discussion see also Macchiarelli
and Ward-Warmedinger, 2015).22 Consistently, sickness benefits, represent-
21On the other hand, as argued by Boskin and Hurd (1978), if higher social security
taxes are needed to finance the increasing burden of an ageing population, this could create
disincentives for people to reduce their labor force participation and withdraw earlier from
the labour market.
22Note that, in the EU-SILC, unemployment benefits also include partial unemployment
benefits, compensating for the loss of wages or salary due to formal short-time working ar-
rangements, and/or intermittent work schedules, irrespective of their cause, and where the
employer/employee relationship continues; and early retirement for labor market reasons,
including periodic payments to older workers who retire before reaching standard retire-
ment age due to unemployment or to job reductions caused by economic measures such
as the restructuring of an industrial sector or of a business enterprise (see also Appendix
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ing cash benefits that replace (in whole or in part) loss of earnings during
temporary inability to work, are not found to significantly affect the hazard
to retire.
In line with the literature, our findings also point to the fact that health
is an important determinant of retirement, as healthier people are found to
continue to work and retire later (see inter alia, Bound, 1991; Jones et al.,
2008; 2010; Deschryvere, 2005; Disney et al., 2006).23 Overall, however – as
highlighted by a growing literature (e.g., Jones et al. 2008; 2010) – measures
of health are subject to an endogeneity problem. There are several reasons
why to expect an endogeneity bias when using self-reporting measures of
health. First, self-reported health is based on subjective assessments which
may not be comparable across individuals (Lindeboom, 2006; Lindeboom
and van Doorslaer, 2004). Second, there is an obvious simultaneity problem
between self-reported health and the labour market status, given that health
problems may represent a legitimate reason for a person in the working age to
be outside the labor market (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Kerkhofs et al.,
1999; Kreider, 1999). Finally, for some individuals there may be incentives
to report health problems as a mean to obtain disability benefits (i.e. the so-
called ‘disability’ route into retirement, see Blundell et al., 2002; Burkhauser,
Butler and Kim; 1995).
Many studies in the literature typically use an instrumental variable ap-
proach, by adopting more ‘objective’ measures of health to instrument self-
reported health measures. Along these lines, an ‘individual health stock’
is normally constructed, where self-reported health is regressed on a set of
specific health problems (see also, Griliches, 1974; Fuller, 1987). As such
questions concerning specific health problems are not available in the EU-
SILC, we take into account the possibility that anticipated retirement may
justify the reporting of bad health by, first, including a dummy every time
individuals receives disability benefits, as discussed. This allow us to control
for possible ‘disability routes’ into retirement (Blundell et al., 2002). Further,
to assess the robustness of previous findings, alternative health measures are
employed, along with the usual set of covariates. More specifically, in Ta-
ble 5 alternative measures, some of which arguably less prone to reporting
A). These payments normally cease when the beneficiary becomes entitled to an old age
pension. Thus, receiving unemployment benefits may unveil information about part-time
working schemes and early retirement patterns in some cases.
23For a survey of the literature see Deschrivere (2005).
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bias than self-reported health are employed, such as a measure of health
limitations (limit) and chronic diseases (see Jones et al., 2008; 2010).
The former (limit) has generally a size effect on the coefficients of interest
while it does not affect their sign and / or significance. This is less the case
for the other proxy (chronic), which captures indeed chronic diseases at large,
which may not affect directly the ability to work. Based on reports of bad
health or a limited ability to work, health status seems indeed to be an
important determinant of retirement decisions.24
To assess whether a change in labour market status from employment to
retirement is more influenced by a (negative) shock to an individual health or
a level effect via slow health deterioration, a ‘health shock’, or a lagged health
variable, is included in the regression, following the discussion in Bound et
al. (1999) and Jones et al. (2010). It seems plausible that the health lag
is more informative about the decision to retire than current health as it
normally takes time to entirely adjust to health limitations and to allow an
individual to gauge his reduced ability to work over time. The use of health
lag has the great advantage of reducing any endogeneity bias by observing
the timing before the decision to effectively retire (see Jones et al., 2010).
In Table 4, the effect of the health shocks is significant. This is broadly
consistent with the evidence obtained when using alternative health shock
measures (see Table 5).25
Occupation statuses and health effects are important also as regard to in-
dividuals’ partners. For instance, predictions regarding a joint labor market
decision of old couples can derive from a family labor supply model like the
one proposed by Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) were couples maximise a
single utility function subject to a household budget constraint with pooled
income. The analysis in this paper does not confirm the prediction that hav-
ing a partner retired significantly increases the hazard to retire, compared to
having a partner employed. The latter idea is in line with the fact that the
24In addition, it should be noted that the the model where a measure of chronic disease
is used is never preferred, based on the log-likelihood, to models where the alternative
health or limit are employed.
25Health is also important as concern the interaction with occupation groups (occ.
group). Such an interaction term suggests that those who work in craft and related trades
workers (including heavy works such as extraction and building) have marginally higher
incentives to retire due to (reported) health problems. For sake of brevity these results
are not reported in Table 4, but are available upon request from the authors.
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primary reason for partners to retire together is shared preferences / sub-
stitution effect for leisure against working longer, with each partner valuing
more retirement when the partner is retired as well (see Killingsworth and
Heckman, 1986; Hurd, 1990; Michaud, 2003). This does not seem to be a
strong factor in the EU or at least given the data sample (see Aranki and
Macchiarelli, 2013). In particular, comparisons of these and our next results
suggest that the partner activity is rather important for people retiring be-
fore the legal retirement age, when controlling for other factors (see next
Section). Moreover, individuals with partners reporting bad health are gen-
erally associated with a lower probability to retire compared to individuals
with partners reporting better health status (see also Wu, 2003).
To assess the overall robustness of our results, the Appendix A.3. repli-
cates the same analysis using a fully parametric regression, with the full set
of controls used in Table 4. The coefficients of interest are virtually un-
changed when a fully parametric set up is used. The fact that controlling for
unobservable (frailty) factors delivers the same set of results also in a fully
parametric framework suggests that the estimates are likely to be sensitive
to unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, using a rich set of covariates and spec-
ifying a functional form – as in the fully-parametric set-up – should reduce
the significance of unobserved factors (under the assumption that the model
is well specified; see Appendix A.3.). The significance of unobserved hetero-
geneity is confirmed in our model by the LR test at the bottom of Table
A2., comparing the likelihood of the model with frailty terms with the model
where θ is set equal to zero).
5.3. Early-retirement decisions
Until now the analysis has focused on individuals retiring. The analysis
provided hitherto is indeed a useful benchmark for the analysis that follows.
Understanding the motivations to retire earlier (before the legal retirement
age), compared to standard retirement patterns, represents indeed an im-
portant factor of analysis. This can be important, especially in the light of
assisting the formulation of policies that might encourage early retirees to
stay at work.
Cox estimates of early retirement decisions are reported in Table 6. Al-
though the results are similar to those presented for the full sample, signifi-
cant differences do exist.
Working (or having worked) with a part-time contract does not play a
significant role in reducing the hazard to retire early. This finding, combined
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with the result in Table 4, may suggests that a gradual reduction in hours
worked over the last segment of the working life can contribute to increased
employment of older workers, at least until (or beyond) the legal retirement
age.
Higher disposable household income and state / health benefits – includ-
ing those temporary in nature, such as sickness benefits – as well as the
availability of private pensions plans significantly increase the hazard to re-
tire early, compared to standard retirement decisions. This suggests that
the choice of pre-retiring should be considered in the light of the expected
retirement needs, or the evaluation of whether the accumulated income /
wealth prior to retiring is considered adequate to sustain the future retire-
ment status. In this vein, early retirements are more sensible to income
effects (including short term benefits and private pension plans; which are
now strongly significant) compared to retiring on or after the legal retirement
age. Along the same lines, and opposite to the results in Table 4, the in-
teraction term between part time and income does not exert any significant
effect (marginally) on early retirement decisions.
Finally, focusing on the individual health status, we show that – analo-
gously to the findings in Table 4 – people with health problems are generally
found to discontinue employment and retire earlier. The health coefficient
for people retiring below the legal retirement age is twice as much the one
reported in Table 4. In particular, for early retirees the hazard to retire based
on bad health is 114% higher (or about 48% if using limit as a bad health
proxy instead),26 compared to about 53% for standard retirement decisions
on or beyond the legal retirement age (or about 18% if using limit as a bad
health proxy instead). Based on estimates of the hazard rates, the cumula-
tive effect of health and its lag, also including alternative health measures, is
even more severe when it comes to early retirement decisions (see Figure 3).
This seems to suggest that, among all the institutional measures scru-
tinized (long term and short term benefits, minimum retirement age, etc.),
none could be sufficient alone if individuals withdraw earlier from the labor
market due to a weakening of their health. Particularly for early retirees,
policies aimed at advance retirement by improving the health of the work-
force and at keeping those who experience health problems active may be
26The results using alternative health measures for early retirement decisions are omitted
for sake of brevity, but they are available upon request from the authors.
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essential.
Figure 2: Cumulative effect of health on retirement and early retirement decisions
5.4. Frailty terms
As the result of employing a ’shared’ frailty model, frailty terms are avail-
able from the estimation and presented in this section. As discussed, frailty
terms control for the fact that some countries may be more prone to retire-
ment than others for unobserved reasons not captured by our covariates (see
Section 4.1). The terms for the 26 EU member states from our ’shared’ frailty
model are shown in Figure 2. Particularly, the panel on the left-hand side
of the figure show the estimated frailty terms from the regression in Table
4. The right-hand side panel of Figure 3 shows results the results from the
regression in Table 6. Cases above the 0 line are the most failure-prone ones.
Figure 3: Frailty terms for EU member states, retirement (left-hand side) and early re-
tirement (right-hand side)
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The results, in Figure 3, provide a mixed picture with some large euro
area countries lying below the zero line (i.e. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands)
while others, e.g. France and Belgium, lying slightly above zero. These
results confirm our previous findings, suggesting that the hazard to enter
retirement is mixed and cannot be reconciled with membership to the euro
area or not. For the early retirement regression, the overall picture changes
only slightly with some countries moving around the zero line (e.g. France,
Italy and Denmark). The countries that move the most are Greece and
Romania, denoting a much higher early-retirement tendency, compared to
retiring on (or beyond) the legal retirement age. Sweden and France move in
the opposite direction, denoting a lower early retirement tendency, compared
to retirement decisions on (or beyond) the legal age.
Although there are no significant differences across regions (EA vs. EU10)
there are clear differences across countries. With the due exceptions (Greece,
Romania - on the one hand - and France and Sweden - on the other hand)
discussed before, however, more prone to retirement countries are also those
who are more prone to retire earlier on average.
6. Conclusions
Schemes to curb public expenditures by increasing the minimum retire-
ment age represents important arguments of discussion in the bargaining set
up (see also Hicks, 2011). However, understanding in greater details the
motivations for (early) retirements could assist the formulation of policies
that might encourage the return of retirees to employment or decrease the
incentives of withdrawing earlier from the labour market.
Workers are often assumed to dace the choice of leaving the labour mar-
ket based on their own preferences (Fengler, 1975; Hayward, Grady and
McLaughlin, 1988) and / or based on the trade-off between market work ver-
sus home production or leisure (for an overview see Bazzoli, 1985; Blndal and
Scarpetta, 1999; Duval, 2003; Gruber and Wise, 2002; Meghir and White-
house, 1997). In practice, however, several constraints can influence the
labour force participation decision of the elderly.
In this paper we employ a wide set of socio-economic and environmental
variables to study exits into retirement in the EU; income and health, in
particular.
Based on longitudinal data from the Eurostat Survey on Income and
Living Conditions (EU-SILC), over the period 2004-2011, we analyse the
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likelihood of retiring at a given age, given that the person has not retired
yet. A number of stylized facts are documented.
First, after controlling for (un)measured risk factor affecting the hazard
to retire in each country, we find no significant differences, on average, in
the patterns of retirement between residents in the euro area and the EU
non-euro area countries. Second, shifts in retirement have increased after the
onset of the 2008-09 economic and financial crisis, when controlling for income
effects. Income, private pension plans and temporary benefits are found to be
important as regards early retirement decisions, when accumulated income
/ wealth is presumably lower, compared to retiring on or beyond the legal
retirement age. In the same vein, flexible working arrangements are found to
be particularly important for workers to keep working just until or beyond
the legal retirement age.
Finally, concerning health measures, this analysis shows overall that,
among all the institutional measures scrutinized (state / health benefits,
minimum retirement age, etc.), none could be sufficient alone if individuals
withdraw from the labour market before the legal retirement age due to a
weakening of their health. Particularly, for early retirees, bad health increases
the hazard to retire by twice as much, compared to standard retirement de-
cisions. Thus, policies aimed at improving the health of the workforce and
at keeping people who experience health problems active may be essential.
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Table 3: Kaplan-Meier survival and Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard functions










20 63804 21 0.9983 0.0001 0.0014 0.002
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
37 16451 367 0.9233 0.0018 0.0757 0.0832
38 14394 415 0.8966 0.0022 0.1036 0.113
39 12311 395 0.8679 0.0025 0.1347 0.146
40 10699 632 0.8166 0.0031 0.1922 0.2068
41 8571 443 0.7744 0.0035 0.2424 0.2599
42 7230 504 0.7204 0.004 0.3103 0.3316
43 5928 385 0.6736 0.0044 0.3734 0.3983
44 4866 320 0.6293 0.0048 0.4373 0.4661
45 4008 356 0.5734 0.0052 0.5234 0.5576
46 3164 249 0.5283 0.0055 0.5996 0.639
47 2565 181 0.491 0.0058 0.6677 0.7121
48 2114 143 0.4578 0.006 0.7327 0.7824
49 1761 106 0.4303 0.0062 0.7905 0.8452
50 1504 236 0.3627 0.0066 0.941 1.0088
51 1114 106 0.3282 0.0068 1.0317 1.1086
52 906 80 0.2992 0.0069 1.1155 1.2016
53 765 69 0.2723 0.007 1.2008 1.2969
54 635 45 0.253 0.0071 1.2675 1.3721
55 543 54 0.2278 0.0072 1.3608 1.4781
56 447 35 0.21 0.0072 1.4338 1.562
57 370 36 0.1895 0.0073 1.5239 1.667
58 309 24 0.1748 0.0073 1.5953 1.7514
59 249 15 0.1643 0.0073 1.65 1.8176
60 210 30 0.1408 0.0074 1.779 1.9753
61 159 17 0.1258 0.0075 1.874 2.0952
62 124 12 0.1136 0.0075 1.9586 2.2054
63 98 10 0.102 0.0076 2.0461 2.3234
64 77 9 0.0901 0.0077 2.1443 2.461
65 65 38 0.0374 0.0064 2.6478 3.1366
Note: The standard error for the Kaplan-Meyer estimate is the one given by
Greenwood (1926).
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EA 0.949 (0.261) Income variables
Crisis 1.449*** (0.052) Disposable income 1.038 (0.031)
Minimum retirement age 0.905*** (0.012) Old age benefits 1.811*** (0.074)
Unemployment benefits 1.852*** (0.114)
Individual characteristics Disability benefits 2.734*** (0.216)
Female 1.513*** (0.075) Sickness benefits 1.126 (0.087)
Married 1.047 (0.079) Private Pension 1.164* (0.097)
Skilled 1.617*** (0.070) Interaction
Part-time 0.115*** (0.054) Part-time x disp. income 1.182*** (0.055)
Occupational group Health variables
2.Occ. group 0.666*** (0.032) Health 1.536*** (0.175)
3.Occ. group 0.945 (0.047) Health(-1) 1.472*** (0.218)
4.Occ. group 0.898* (0.052)
5.Occ. group 0.838*** (0.051) Partner characteristics
2.Partner unemployed 1.344*** (0.129)
3.Partner retired 1.045 (0.039)
4.Partner inactive 1.117** (0.052)
Partner’s health 0.7496*** (0.084)
Statistics
θ 0.448 (0.119)
LR test (frailty terms) Prob>χ̄2 = (0.000)
Wald χ2 1341.13
Prob > χ2 (0.000)
Log-likelihood -34036.317
Number of groups 26
Observations 45,439
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. See Appendix A for data and definitions.
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Wald χ2 1341.13 1332.20 1315.48
Prob > χ2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log-likelihood -34036.317 -34039.526 -34047.226
Number of groups 26 26 26
Observations 45,439 45,439 45,439
Note: All regressions include a full set of covariates as in Table 4. The whole
results are available upon request from the authors. Standard errors in paren-
theses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table A (Appendix A)
for data and definitions.
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Crisis 1.512*** (0.068) Disposable income 1.148*** (0.040)
Minimum retirement age 0.847*** (0.014) Old age benefits 2.9327*** (0.134)
Unemployment benefits 1.640*** (0.110)
Individual characteristics Disability benefits 2.354*** (0.201)
Female 1.369*** (0.083) Sickness benefits 1.347*** (0.124)
Married 1.056 (0.099) Private pension 1.436*** (0.183)
Skilled 1.866*** (0.098) Interaction
Part-time 1.004 (0.640) Part-time x disp. income 0.977 (0.061)
Occupational group Health variables
2.Occ. group 0.756*** (0.045) Health 2.139*** (0.292)
3.Occ. group 0.811*** (0.047) Health(-1) 1.762*** (0.326)
4.Occ. group 0.7656*** (0.051)
5.Occ. group 0.749*** (0.055) Partner characteristics
2.Partner unemployed 1.357*** (0.143)
3.Partner retired 1.121** (0.052)
4.Partner inactive 1.112** (0.060)
Partner’s health 0.779* (0.118)
Statistics
θ 0.506 (0.134)
LR test (frailty terms) Prob>χ̄2 = (0.000)
Wald χ2 1537.66
Prob > χ2 (0.000)
Log-likelihood -22779.249
Number of groups 26
Observations 43,335
Note: The whole results are available upon request from the authors. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See
Appendix A.1. for data and definitions.
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Appendix A. Variables used in the estimation
Dependent variables27
Employment duration : The amount of time that an individual spends in
employment before entering into retirement.
Employment duration, early : The amount of time that an individual
spends in employment before entering into early retirement (before the legal
retirement age).
Explanatory variables
Activity : Main activity status during the income reference period. If the
main activity is not ‘a job or business’, the status is self-defined. The main
activity status during the income reference period is ‘at work’ if the respon-
dent worked (or was in paid apprenticeship or training) the majority of weeks
during the income reference period. If a person spends the same number of
weeks in different activities, priority should be given to economic activity
(‘main activity job or business’) over non-economic activity and over inac-
tivity.
- Employed: Equals 1 if the individual is at work. A person is at work if he
works at least 1 hour during the reference week.
- Unemployed: Equals 2 if the individual is unemployed.
- Retired: Equals 3 if the individual is in retirement or early retirement.
- Inactive: Equals 4 if the individual classifies himself as any other inactive
person.
Change activity : Most recent change in the individual’s activity status.
The variable records changes in the individual activity status over the last
interview (or last 12 months for the first year of data collection).
- Employed - retired: Equals 1 if the individual changed from employment
to retirement.
- Unemployed - retired: Equals 2 if the individual changed from unemploy-
ment to retirement.
- Retired - employed: Equals 3 if the individual changed from retirement to
employment.
- Retired - unemployed: Equals 4 if the individual changed from retirement
to unemployment.
- Retired - inactive: Equals 5 if the individual changed from retirement to
27See also the EU-SILC’s Guidelines.
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inactive other than retirement.
Inactive - retired Equals 6 if the individual changed from inactivity other
than retirement to retirement.
EA: Equals 1 if a country belongs to the euro area.
Crisis: Equals 1 if year of the survey equals 2009 or more.
Minimum ret. age : Countries’ minimum retirement age according to
OECD (2011).
Female : Equals1 if the interviewed is of female gender.
Married : Equals 1 if the interviewed is married.
Skilled : Equals 1 if the interviewed has high education according to the
highest ISCED level attained. This includes first stage of tertiary education
(not leading directly to an advanced research qualification) and second stage
of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research qualification.
Occ. Groups : The variable conforms to the ISCO-88 (COM) International
Standard Classification of Occupations.
- 1: Equals 1 if the individual belongs to legislators, senior officials and man-
agers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals or clerks.
- 2: Equals 2 if the individual belongs to service workers and shop and mar-
ket sales workers, skilled agricultural and fishery workers.
- 3: Equals 3 if the individual belongs to craft and related trades workers.
- 4: Equals 4 if the individual belongs to plant and machine operators and
assemblers.
- 5: Equals 5 if the individual has a elementary occupation.
Part-time : Equals 1 if the individual works or worked part-time based on
a self-defined economic status.
Disposable income : (Log) total disposable household income. This in-
cludes the sum for all household members of gross personal income compo-
nents (gross employee cash or near cash income; gross non-cash employee
income; company car; employers’ social insurance contributions; gross cash
benefits or losses from self-employment (including royalties); value of goods
produced for own consumption; pensions received from individual private
plans; unemployment benefits; old-age benefits; survivor’ benefits, sickness
benefits; disability benefits and education-related allowances plus gross in-
come components at household level (imputed rent; income from rental of a
property or land; family/children related allowances; social exclusion not else-
where classified; housing allowances; regular inter-household cash transfers
received; interests, dividends, profit from capital investments in unincorpo-
rated business; income received by people aged under 16) minus (employer’s
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social insurance contributions interest paid on mortgage; regular taxes on
wealth; regular inter-household cash transfer paid; tax on income and social
insurance contributions).
Private pension : Equals 1 if the household receive pensions from indi-
vidual private plans (other than those covered under ESSPROS). The latter
source is considered an extension of the standard income definition and it is
cumulated for all members of the same household.
Part-time X disp. Income : Interaction term between part-time and dis-
posable income.
Old age benefits : Equals 1 if the individual receives non-zero old age ben-
efits. By definition, the old age function refers to the provision of social
protection against the risk linked to old age, loss of income, inadequate in-
come, lack of independence in carrying out daily tasks, reduced participation
in social life, and so on. Old age benefits cover benefits that: provide a re-
placement income when the aged person retires from the labour market, or
guarantee a certain income when a person has reached a prescribed age.
Disability benefits: Equals 1 if the individual receives non-zero disabil-
ity benefits. Disability benefits refer to benefits that provide an income to
persons below standard retirement age whose ability to work and earn is
impaired beyond a minimum level laid down by legislation by a physical or
mental disability. Disability is the full or partial inability to engage in eco-
nomic activity or to lead a normal life due to a physical or mental impairment
that is likely to be either permanent or to persist beyond a minimum pre-
scribed period.
Sickness benefits: Equals 1 if the individual receives non-zero sickness
benefits. Sickness benefits refer to cash benefits that replace in whole or in
part loss of earnings during temporary inability to work due to sickness or
injury. Being temporary in nature, those include only paid leave or cash ben-
efits in case of self-reported sickness or injury or that of a dependent child.
Unempl. Benefits : Equals 1 if the individual receives non-zero unemploy-
ment benefits. Unemployment benefits refer to benefits that replace in whole
or in part income lost by a worker due to the loss of gainful employment;
provide a subsistence (or better) income to persons entering or re-entering
the labor market; compensate for the loss of earnings due to partial unem-
ployment; replace in whole or in part income lost by an older worker who
retires from gainful employment before the legal retirement age because of
job reductions for economic reasons; contribute to the cost of training or
re-training people looking for employment; or help unemployed persons meet
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the cost of traveling or relocating to obtain employment.
Health : Equals 1 if the individual assesses his health is ’very bad’. The
measurement of self-perceived health is, by its very nature, subjective. The
notion is restricted to an assessment coming from the individual and not from
anyone outside that individual. The reference is to health in general rather
than the present state of health, as the question is not intended to measure
temporary health problems. It is expected to include the different dimen-
sions of health, i.e. physical, social and emotional function and bio-medical
signs and symptoms. It omits any reference to an age as respondents are
not specifically asked to compare their health with others of the same age or
with their own previous or future health state.
Partner’s activity : Main activity status of the partner (if any) during the
income reference period. See Activity definition.
- Employed: Equals 1 if the partner is at work.
- Unemployed: Equals 2 if the partner is unemployed
- Retired: Equals 3 if the partner is in retirement or early retirement.
- Inactive: Equals 4 if the partner is inactive.
Partner’s health : Equals 1 if each individual’s partner (if any) assesses
his health to be ’very bad’. See Health definition.
Alternative health measures
Limit : Equals 1 if the individual reports limitations in activities because of
health problems. The purpose of the instrument is to measure the presence
of long-standing limitations, as the consequences of these limitations (e.g.
care, dependency) are more serious. The period of at least the last 6 months
is relating to the duration of the activity limitation and not of the health
problem. The answer to this question is yes (1 or 2) if the person is currently
limited and has been limited in activities for at least the last 6 months.
Chronic: Equals 1 if the individual reports to suffer from any chronic (long-
standing) illness or condition.
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Appendix B. Additional Graphs
Figure A1: Survival function for the transition from employment into retirement for sep-
arate groups
Note: Test results, i.e. log-rank (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959) and Wilcoxon (Breslow,
1970; Gehan, 1965), for the equality of the different survivor functions suggest that the
equality of the survivor functions is rejected.
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Figure A2: Survival function for the transition from employment into retirement by coun-
try
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Appendix C. Sensitivity analysis of the model: full-parametric re-
gressions
In order to investigate if the estimated Cox coefficients are robust, in what
follows we present results from a full-parametric model.28 As discussed in
Section 3.1, when applying parametric models it is necessary to specify a cer-
tain functional form of the hazard rate that fits the data. The likelihood-ratio
or Wald test can be used to discriminate between groups of nested models
(Cleves et al., 2010). In the present case, the results of the likelihood-ratio
test indicate that the generalized gamma distribution fits well.29 However,
when models are not nested, likelihood-ratio or Wald test tests are not ap-
propriate and an alternative statistic has to be used. The most common is
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Akaike (1974) proposed a method
penalising each models’ log-likelihood to reflect the number of parameters
being estimated and then comparing them.30
In Table A.3 an overview of the computed AIC scores is presented. There
are slight differences in the value of the log-likelihood function between the
models. Although the log-logistic distribution scores best, the results reveal
that the Weibull model is the preferred specification in the proportional haz-
ard form.31 Note, also that the Weibull model has virtually the same AIC
scores as the log-logistic one.32 Furthermore, as shown in the non-parametric
28One of the assumptions underlying the Cox model is the proportional hazards as-
sumption. Evaluating the robustness of the estimated Cox proportional hazard models,
it is shown (from the results in Section 5.2) that the joint Wald test of all coefficients
equal to 0 is rejected at a standard significance level in all cases. However, the test of the
proportional hazards assumption using Schoenfeld’s (1982) residuals is rejected. Since we
are more interested in the parameter estimates than the shape of the hazard in this paper,
the Cox proportional hazard model is, nevertheless, well-suited to this goal.
29We start from a generalized gamma model for evaluating and selecting an appropriate
parametric model. We test the hypothesis that the ancillary parameters for the generalized
gamma distribution (with standard deviation) kappa = 0 (model is log-normal); kappa =
1 (model is Weibull); and kappa = 1 and sigma = 1 (model is exponential). By testing
the appropriate restrictions, it is found that we can reject the log-normal, the Weibull and
the exponential distribution against the gamma for all samples.
30The AIC compares the likelihood scores while taking into account the degrees of
freedom used in each model. AIC = -2* log-likelihood + 2 * (k + c), where k is the
number of model covariates and c the number of model-specific distributional parameters.
31Since the Weibull can be specified in both the proportional hazard and accelerated
failure time form we can compare it to other accelerated failure time distributional forms.
32This is the case also for the generalized gamma distribution.
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analysis above, the hazard of exiting into retirement exhibits a monotonically
increase. Thus, based on these combined assessment, the more reasonable
Weibull distribution is employed.33 Estimates using the log-logistic distribu-
tion do not produce any relevant differences compared to the Weibull esti-
mates, suggesting that the selection effect of using distributions other than
the Weibull is limited.
In Table A2 the time ratios from the estimated – Weibull distributed –
accelerated failure time model are presented.
The results of the Weibull model are qualitatively the same and consis-
tent with those of the Cox proportional hazard regression in Table 4. An
important difference to bear in mind when interpreting the results is that in
proportional hazard models (such as Cox’s) the estimates are interpreted as
the effect on the employment exit rate; while accelerated failure time models
analyse the effect on the employment period.34
33The Weibull model assumes a baseline hazard of the form h0(t) = p
tp−1exp(β0), where
p is some ancillary shape parameter estimated from the data, and the scale parameter is
parameterised as exp(β0). The Weibull distribution can provide a variety of monotonically
increasing or decreasing shapes of the hazard function, and their shape is determined by
the estimated parameter p.
34Additionally, it should be noted from Table A2 that the Wald test on the ancillary
shape parameter (p) indicates that we can reject the hypothesis that the hazard is a
constant, suggesting a monotone increasing behaviour over time. The hypothesis that
ln(p) = 0 is rejected at the 1% significance level for all observations. The parameter
p is the ‘shape’ parameter, as it defines the shape of the distribution. If p = 1, then
the hazard is constant. For other values of p, the Weibull hazard is not constant; it is
monotone decreasing when p < 1 and monotone increasing when p > 1.
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Table A1: Model selection for full parametric regressions
Distribution (metric) Log likeli-
hood
k c AIC Ranking
Whole sample (retirement)
Exponential (PH, AFT) -9850.973 25 1 19751.95 6
Weibull (PH, AFT) -1925.130 26 2 3902.259 3
Gompertz (PH) -2210.403 26 2 4472.806 4
Log-normal (AFT) -3090.066 26 2 6232.132 5
Log-logistic (AFT) -1890.774 26 2 3833.547 1
Generalized gamma (AFT) -1908.454 27 3 3870.908 2
Note: The models are estimated assuming gamma distributed frailty or het-
erogeneity.
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EA 1.015 (0.033) Income variables
Crisis 0.960*** (0.004) Disposable income 0.993** (0.003)
Minimum retirement age 1.011*** (0.002) Old age benefits 0.937*** (0.004)
Unemployment benefits 0.925*** (0.007)
Individual characteristics. Disability benefits 0.881*** (0.008)
Female 0.9519*** (0.006) Sickness benefits 0.989 (0.009)
Married 0.992 (0.009) Private pension 0.983* (0.010)
Skilled 0.949*** (0.005) Interaction
Part-time 1.311*** (0.074) Part-time x disp. income 0.980*** (0.005)
Occupational group Health variables
2.Occ. group 1.054*** (0.006) Health 0.960*** (0.013)
3.Occ. group 1.003 (0.006) Health(-1) 0.960*** (0.017)
4.Occ. group 1.010 (0.007)
5.Occ. group 1.016** (0.007) Partner characteristics
2.Partner unemployed 0.966*** (0.011)
3.Partner retired 0.992* (0.004)
4.Partner inactive 0.982*** (0.005)





LR test (frailty terms) Prob>=chi-bar-sq.
= (0.000)
Wald χ2 1237.00
Prob > χ2 (0.000)
Log-likelihood -1181.2451
Number of groups 26
Observations 45,439
Note: The whole results are available upon request from the authors. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See
Appendix A for data and definitions.
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